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Too Close for Comfort: The Potential
Dilemma Facing the Securities and
Exchange Commission and the Public
Accounting Oversight Board
David H. Roberts*
Introduction
In the wake of major accounting scandals at such corpora-
tions as Enron and WorldCom, a number of proposals were in-
troduced before Congress in an attempt to address the
conditions that led to these scandals. Many of the proposals
shared the common assumption that the past oversight of pub-
lic accountants was inadequate.1 Around that same time pe-
riod, a number of high-ranking members of the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") declared that the SEC would be-
gin to move more aggressively in pursuing enforcement actions
against both individual public accountants 2 and public account-
ing firms. 3 The former Chairman of the SEC, Harvey Pitt,
stated that the SEC would step-up actions against public ac-
countants accused of financial fraud and noted that there will
be "a substantial increase in [the SEC's] involvement in the dis-
cipline process."4 The former Director of the SEC's Enforcement
Division, Stephen Cutler, stated that it was time to adopt a new
* Associate at Goodwin Procter LLP; Northeastern University School of Law,
2004. I would like to thank Professor Dan Danielson and Professor Arthur Laby for
their valuable insights and guidance. Also, special thanks to John Roberts and
Ashley Mauldin for their tireless assistance.
1. MARK JINCKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21173, AUDITOR OVERSIGHT:
PROPOSALS FOR A NEW REGULATOR 3 (Apr. 18, 2002).
2. Mike McNamee, How the SEC Plans to Police Accountants, BUSINESS
WEEK, Jan. 18, 2002, available at http://www.businessweek.comlbwdaily/dnflash/
jan2002/nf20020118_0337.htm.
3. Stephen M. Cutler, Director, Division of Enforcement, Sec. Exch. Comm'n,
Remarks Before the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (Dec. 12,
2002) available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spchl2l2O2smc.htm.
4. McNamee, supra note 2.
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enforcement paradigm, "one that reverses the current presump-
tion against suing firms for an audit failure."5
With the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("SOX"), the
SEC may seek to pursue a more aggressive enforcement policy
regarding public accountants with new regulatory tools and ma-
chinery. However, a comparison of SOX and the regulations
that were in place prior to the passage of SOX suggests little
change in the SEC's enforcement and remedial authority as it
pertains to public accountants. The main effect of SOX seems to
be a possible change in enforcement personnel.
An unintended consequence of the creation of dual author-
ity in the SEC and the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board ("PCAOB") to oversee public accountants is that an en-
forcement action by one of these parties may preclude or se-
verely limit an enforcement action by the other. Congress could
remedy this potential preclusion, however, if Congress does not
act, the preclusion need not bar the SEC and PCAOB from at-
taining their regulatory goals regarding public accountants.
Rather, the new regime of the SEC and the PCAOB taken as a
whole should be able to cure past regulatory inadequacies given
that a well funded PCAOB with strong oversight from the SEC
can offer a heightened level of regulation.
Section I provides a brief summary of the role of public ac-
countants and the regulatory regime for public accountants, in-
cluding the enforcement power of the SEC, before and after the
passage of SOX. Section II explores how under the current law
the overlapping powers and authority of the SEC and PCAOB
could lead to the actions of one precluding the actions of the
other under the legal doctrines of collateral estoppel and res
judicata. Finally, Section III suggests a potential Congressional
remedy to this preclusion and discusses why the post-SOX sys-
tem should nevertheless cure past inadequacies in the regula-
tion of public accountants even if Congress chooses not to act.
5. Cutler, supra note 3.
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I. The Regulation of Public Accountants Pre and Post-SOX
A. The Role of Public Accountants
A public accountant is an individual who furnishes account-
ing or auditing services for more than one client on a fee basis,
while a certified public accountant ("CPA") is one who has re-
ceived from the proper board or commission a certificate quali-
fying him to hold himself out and practice as such.6 Public
accountants have a number of roles under the federal securities
laws. One of their most significant roles, and the role that this
Article focuses on, is auditing financial statements filed with
the SEC. 7 The audit function is of critical importance given
that public accountants provide assurance to investors that an
issuers' financial statements conform to generally accepted ac-
counting principles ("GAAP") and that the public accountants'
audits were performed in compliance with the standards of the
PCAOB.8
B. Regulation of Public Accountants Pre-SOX
Historically, regulation of the public accounting profession
and enforcement of its standards of practice were largely depen-
dent on the profession itself. The American Institute of Certi-
fied Public Accountants ("AICPA"), a private trade
organization, essentially stood at the center of this self-regula-
tion.9 Members of the AICPA, who audited public companies,
were required to join the Securities Exchange Commission
Practice Section ("SECPS") of the AICPA.10 The SECPS would
conduct inspections of its members under the "peer review" pro-
gram, which was in place to ensure that audits of financial
statements were being performed consistently with the profes-
6. 1 AM. JUR. 2D Accountants § 1 (2003).
7. Adopting Release, 63 Fed. Reg. 57164-01, 57165 n.13 (Oct. 26, 1998).
8. PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD No. 2003-025, AUDITING
STANDARD No. 1, REFERENCES IN AUDITORS' REPORT TO THE STANDARDS OF THE
PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD at A-3 (Dec. 17, 2003).
9. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, No. 02-411 THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION:
STATUS OF PANEL ON AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS RECOMMENDATIONS TO ENHANCE THE
SELF-REGULATORY SYSTEM 6 (May 2002).
10. Sally S. Spielvogel, Exploring The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Will Government
Intervention in the Public Accounting Profession Prevent Another Enron?, 92 Ky.
L.J. 339, 347 (2003).
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sion's standards.11 AICPA members could be subject to enforce-
ment actions from the AICPA for violations of the profession's
standards. 12 The Public Oversight Board ("POB"), comprised of
five public members, was in place to oversee the SECPS and to
represent the public interest regarding the integrity of the audit
process. 3 The former Chairman of the POB, Charles Bowsher,
noted that this system of oversight had serious flaws, including
the fact that the POB's funding was subject to control by the
auditing firms through the SECPS.' 4 In the past, the SECPS
had gone so far as to cut off the POB's funding in order to cur-
tail POB activities. 15
Although the profession was largely self-regulated, the
state boards of accountancy and the SEC also participated in
the oversight of public accountants. State boards of account-
ancy, which grant CPAs their licenses, have the ability to re-
voke those licenses. 16 State boards of accountancy were not
equipped to be a strong enforcement presence due to limited
budgets and the lack of effective means to investigate allega-
tions and impose disciplinary measures. 17 The SEC on the
other hand has the authority to make and enforce both account-
ing and auditing rules.'8 From an enforcement perspective, due
to a lack of resources, the SEC was often forced to pursue cases
against only those public accountants responsible for the most
egregious violations.' 9 To put this lack of funding in perspec-
tive, in the year 2000, Enron spent $25 million for audit ser-
vices while the SEC's budget for 2000 was only $368 million. 20
Hence, the cost of Enron's 2000 audit alone equaled nearly
11. Id.
12. Id. at 356.
13. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 9, at 8.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 7, 18-19.
16. George J. Benston, The Regulation of Accountants and Public Accounting
Before and After Enron, 52 EMORY L.J. 1325, 1345 (2003).
17. U.S. GEN, ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 9, at 26.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 77s(b) (2004); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77s(a), 78c(b), 80a-37(a) 77m(b)
(2004).
19. David Hilzenrath, Auditors Face Scant Discipline: Review Process Lacks
Resources, Coordination, Will, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2001, at A01.
20. JICKLING, supra note 1, at n.2.
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seven percent of the SEC's budget, and Enron was just one of
17,000 companies that submitted filings with the SEC.21
Pre-SOX, most impartial observers would argue that there
was a systemic problem with the disciplinary function of the
public accounting industry's self-regulation, and that changes
were needed. 22 In addition to the lack of proper oversight of the
SECPS, limitations of the state boards of accountancy and lack
of funding for the SEC, one of the main problems with self-regu-
lation was that the AICPA was a toothless tiger. In the
AICPA's enforcement capacity, the AICPA had never disci-
plined a major accounting firm as of 2002.23 Also, fewer than
one out of every five accountants who had been sanctioned by
the SEC for unprofessional conduct were subjected to discipline
by the AICPA.24
C. Regulation of Public Accountants Post-SOX
Under SOX, Congress created the PCAOB, which for all
practical purposes abrogated a number of the AICPA's responsi-
bilities regarding public accountants that perform audits of
publicly traded companies. 25 Post-SOX, all accounting firms
that prepare or issue audit reports on U.S. public companies are
required to register with the PCAOB 26 and as of April 18, 2008
there were 1,847 accounting firms registered with the
PCAOB. 27 The duties of the PCAOB include, but are not limited
to, conducting inspections of registered public accounting firms
(successor to the SECPS's peer review process) and promulgat-
ing the professions audit and ethical standards. 28 The PCAOB
is also responsible for bringing enforcement actions against
21. Id.
22. U.S. GEN ACCOUNTING OFFICE, No. GAO-02-742R, THE ACCOUNTING PRO-
FESSION: STATUS OF PANEL ON AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS RECOMMENDATIONS TO EN-
HANCE THE SELF-REGULATORY SYSTEM 1 (May 3, 2002).
23. Lisa K. Buckser-Schulz, Congratulations to Arthur Andersen: Why Self-
Regulation of the Accounting Industry Doesn't Work, 4 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR AD-
VOCATE 2 (First Quarter 2002), available at http://www.blbglaw.com/publications/
1Q021isab.pdf.
24. Id.
25. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211(a) (West 2004).
26. Id. § 7212(a).
27. PCAOB.com, Registered Public Accounting Firms (2007), http://www.
pcaob.com/Registration/Registered-Firms.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
28. 15 U.S.C.A § 7211(c).
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those registered public accounting firms, and associated person
thereof, that have violated the federal securities laws relating
to the preparation and issuance of audit reports (including the
rules of the SEC issued under SOX), rules of the PCAOB, provi-
sions of SOX or professional standards.2 9 SOX defines profes-
sional standards to include accounting principles, auditing
standards, standards for attestation engagements, quality con-
trol policies and procedures, ethical and competency standards,
and independence standards. 30 The PCAOB can seek a number
of disciplinary or remedial sanctions depending on the severity
of the violation. Where there has been intentional or knowing
conduct on the part of a public accountant, including reckless or
repeated instances of negligent conduct, the PCAOB can seek to
suspend or permanently revoke registration with the PCAOB; a
suspension or bar of a person from further association with any
registered public accounting firm; temporary or permanent lim-
itation on the activities, functions, or operations of such firm or
person; monetary penalties; censure; to require additional pro-
29. Id. § 7215(c)(4).
If the [PCAOB] finds, based on all of the facts and circumstances, that a
registered public accounting firm or associated person thereof has engaged
in any act or practice, or omitted to act, in violation of this Act, the rules of
the [PCAOB], the provisions of the securities laws relating to the prepara-
tion and issuance of audit reports and the obligations and liabilities of ac-
countants with respect thereto, including the rules of the [SEC] issued
under this Act, or professional standards, the [PCAOB] may impose such
disciplinary or remedial sanctions as it determines appropriate.
Id.
30. Id. § 7201(10). "Professional standards" is defined as follows:
(A) accounting principles that are-
(i) established by the standard setting body described in section [19(b)
of the Securities Act of 1933], as amended by [SOX], or prescribed
by the [SEC] under section [19(a) of the Securities Act or section
13(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934]; and
(ii) relevant to audit reports for particular issuers, or dealt with in the
quality control system of a particular registered public accounting
firm; and
(B) auditing standards, standards for attestation engagements, quality con-
trol policies and procedures, ethical and competency standards, and in-
dependence standards that the [PCAOBI or the [SEC] determines-
(i) relate to the preparation or issuance of audit reports for issuers;
and
(ii) are established or adopted by the [PCAOB under section 103(a)], or
are promulgated as rules of the Commission.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol28/iss3/2
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fessional education or training; or any other appropriate sanc-
tion provided for in the rules of the PCAOB.31 Where there has
been a single act of negligent conduct on the part of a public
accountant, the PCAOB is limited to seeking monetary penal-
ties; censure; additional professional education or training; and
any other appropriate sanction provided for in the rules of the
PCAOB.32
The SEC's authority over public accountants changed very
little under SOX. The SEC still has the authority to make and
enforce both accounting and auditing rules. 33 In its enforce-
ment capacity, the SEC has the same two actions at its disposal
as it did before SOX: administrative actions and injunctive ac-
31. 15 U.S.C. section 7215(c)(4)-(5) states that the PCAOB:
(4) [M]ay impose such disciplinary or remedial sanctions as it determines
appropriate, subject to applicable limitations under paragraph (5),
including:
(A) temporary suspension or permanent revocation of registration
under this [title];
(B) temporary or permanent suspension or bar of a person from further
association with any registered public accounting firm;
(C) temporary or permanent limitation on the activities, functions, or
operations of such firm or person (other than in connection with re-
quired additional professional education or training);
(D) a civil money penalty for each such violation, in an amount equal
to-
(i) not more than $100,000 for a natural person or $2,000,000 for
any other person; and
(ii) in any case to which paragraph (5) applies, not more than
$750,000 for a natural person or $15,000,000 for any other
person;
(E) censure;
(F) required additional professional education or training; or
(G) any other appropriate sanction provided for in the rules of the
[PCAOBI.
(5) Intentional or Other Knowing Conduct-The sanctions and penalties de-
scribed in subparagraphs (A) through (C) and (D)(ii) of paragraph (4)
shall only apply to-
(A) intentional or knowing conduct, including reckless conduct, that re-
sults in violation of the applicable statutory, regulatory, or profes-
sional standard; or
(B) repeated instances of negligent conduct, each resulting in a violation
of the applicable statutory, regulatory, or professional standard.
15 U.S.C.A § 7215(c)(4)-(5).
32. Id.
33. Id. § 7202(c).
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tions which are brought in federal court.34 The SEC weighs a
number of factors in determining whether to seek administra-
tive or injunctive relief. Factors such as a severe violation of
the federal securities laws and a lack of cooperation with the
SEC's staff may cause the SEC to seek injunctive over adminis-
trative relief.35
Administrative proceedings against public accountants in
professional discipline cases are brought by the SEC under Rule
102(e). 36 The SEC may bring proceedings under Rule 102(e)
against a public accountant for not possessing the requisite
qualifications; a lack of character or integrity; a violation of the
professional standards; unethical or improper professional con-
duct; and willful violations of the federal securities laws.3 7 Im-
34. Harvey L. Pitt, et. al., "Court-ing Disaster": The Factors That Prompt the
SEC to Seek Injunctive Relief, 908 PLI/CoRP 269, 272 (1995).
35. Id. at 271.
36. Norman S. Johnson & Ross A. Albert, "Djd Vu All Over Again": The Se-
curities and Exchange Commission Once More Attempts to Regulate the Accounting
Profession Through Rule 102(e) of its Rules of Practice, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 553,
568.
37. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2004) states:
(1) Generally. The Commission may censure a person or deny, temporarily
or permanently, the privilege of appearing or practicing before it in any
way to any person who is found by the Commission after notice and op-
portunity for hearing in the matter:
(i) Not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others; or
(ii) To be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethi-
cal or improper professional conduct; or
(iii) To have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the viola-
tion of any provision of the Federal securities laws or the rules and
regulations thereunder.
(iv) With respect to persons licensed to practice as accountants, "im-
proper professional conduct" under § 201.102(e)(1)(ii) means:
(A) Intentional or knowing conduct, including reckless conduct,
that results in a violation of applicable professional standards;
or
(B) Either of the following two types of negligent conduct:
(1) A single instance of highly unreasonable conduct that re-
sults in a violation of applicable professional standards in
circumstances in which an accountant knows, or should
know, that heightened scrutiny is warranted.
(2) Repeated instances of unreasonable conduct, each resulting
in a violation of applicable professional standards, that indi-
cate a lack of competence to practice before the Commission.
(2) Certain professionals and convicted persons. Any attorney who has been
suspended or disbarred by a court of the United States or of any State;
or any person whose license to practice as an accountant, engineer, or
502
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proper professional conduct includes intentional or knowing
conduct, including reckless conduct, and certain negligent con-
duct.38 Negligent conduct encompasses a single instance of
highly unreasonable conduct that results in a violation of appli-
cable professional standards in circumstances in which a public
accountant knows, or should know, that heightened scrutiny is
warranted or repeated instances of unreasonable conduct, each
resulting in a violation of applicable professional standards,
that indicate a lack of competence to practice before the SEC. 39
In Rule 102(e) proceedings, 40 the SEC can only seek to censure
or to deny a public accountant the privilege of practicing before
the SEC, it cannot seek monetary penalties. 41 In the past, the
use of this rule by the SEC was not without controversy. Before
Congress codified Rule 102(e), 42 there was some question as to
whether the SEC had the authority to promulgate and enforce
such a rule.43
Injunctive actions can be brought by the SEC against pub-
lic accountants when they are engaged in or about to engage in
any violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 and any rules promulgated thereun-
der, and for the rules of the PCAOB. 44 In injunctive actions, the
SEC can seek an injunction against further violations of the fed-
eral securities laws and the SEC can also seek monetary penal-
other professional or expert has been revoked or suspended in any State;
or any person who has been convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor in-
volving moral turpitude shall be forthwith suspended from appearing or
practicing before the Commission. A disbarment, suspension, revocation
or conviction within the meaning of this section shall be deemed to have
occurred when the disbarring, suspending, revoking or convicting
agency or tribunal enters its judgment or order, including a judgment or
order on a plea of nolo contendere, regardless of whether an appeal of
such judgment or order is pending or could be taken.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. One point of note is that historically the SEC has not considered Rule
102(e) to be an enforcement remedy. Adopting Release, 63 Fed. Reg. 57164-01,
57170 (Oct. 26, 1998). This distinction has been seen as pretextual by a number of
commentators. See Johnson & Albert, supra note 36, at 580; see also Leo F. Oren-
stein & Marc B. Dorfman, A Rule Gone Bad: SEC No Longer Needs to Rely on Rule
102(e), but Can't Seem to Let It Go, 23 LEGAL TIMEs 46 (Nov. 20, 2000).
41. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2004).
42. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78d-3 (West 2004).
43. S. REP. No. 107-205, at 42 (2002).
44. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(t)(a) (West 2004); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(1) (West 2004).
2008] 503
9
PACE LAW REVIEW
ties. 45 The SEC for the last few decades has been relying less on
injunctive actions and more heavily on Rule 102(e) administra-
tive actions, because the federal courts have made it increas-
ingly difficult for the SEC to obtain injunctive relief.46 These
difficulties arose in large part from the U.S. Supreme Court's
holding that scienter is an element of a violation for the follow-
ing antifraud provisions amongst others: Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; Rule 10b-5, which was
promulgated under Section 10(b); and Section 17(a)(1) of the Se-
curities Act of 1933.47
II. Unforeseen Consequences in the Creation of the PCAOB
It appears that the SEC intends that the newly created
PCAOB's enforcement powers combined with the existing en-
forcement powers of the SEC will mean more firepower in the
enforcement of the public accounting profession's standards.
Prior to the passage of SOX, former SEC Chairman Pitt, in his
written testimony to the United State Senate's Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs noted the following on the
creation of an independent oversight board:
This private sector body would supplement our enforcement ef-
forts, by adding a layer, or tier, of new regulation. There should
be no misunderstanding. In the first instance, we, and our Divi-
sion of Enforcement, will continue vigorously to investigate and
pursue instances of illegal conduct. The SEC has had a successful
history with two-tier regulation that involves the private sector.
Such two-tier regulation has been largely successful with the bro-
kerage industry.48
Subsequent to the passage of SOX, the SEC still appears
intent on utilizing a two-tiered enforcement strategy. In De-
45. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(1)-(3) (West 2004).
46. See Johnson & Albert, supra note 36, at 568 n.44.
47. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197-98 (1976) (requiring proof
of scienter in private Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 actions); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S.
680, 701-02 (1980) (scienter required in governmental law enforcement actions
under Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5 and Section 17(a)(1) but not under 17(a)(2) and
17(a)(3)).
48. Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, Sec. Exch. Comm'n, Written Testimony Con-
cerning Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other
Public Companies (Mar. 21, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testi-
mony/032102tshlp.htm.
504 [Vol. 28:495
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cember of 2004, Susan Markel, the SEC's Division of Enforce-
ment's Chief Accountant, stated that the PCAOB has not
replaced the SEC in auditor enforcement cases.49 Markel stated
that the PCAOB's enforcement capabilities should be viewed as
an addition, as opposed to an alternative, to SEC enforcement. 50
It should be noted that the PCAOB and SEC have yet to bring
an enforcement proceeding against the same individual arising
out of the same action, although the PCAOB has only brought a
limited number of proceedings to date.51
If it is the PCAOB's and SEC's intention to act against the
same public accountant, this combined firepower may never
come to fruition. An unintended consequence of Congress
granting the PCAOB enforcement authority virtually identical
to the SEC's, may be that one might be precluded from litigat-
ing issues or claims already litigated by the other against the
same public accountant. This preclusion would arise from the
legal doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata.
Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the resolution by
a court of an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment pre-
cludes the relitigation of that issue in a subsequent suit,
whether based on the same or a different claim. 52 Res judicata
prevents the relitigation of any claim that was or that might
have been brought in a prior action where there has been full
consideration and a final decision in a prior proceeding.5 3 Res
judicata can be distinguished from collateral estoppel in that
the application of the doctrine of res judicata necessitates an
identity of the claim while the invocation of collateral estoppel
does not. Therefore, even if a court were to find there was no
identity of the claim, the defense of collateral estoppel may still
be available. Although the recent trend in modern case law is
to separate the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel,
49. Wolters Kluwer Law and Business, SEC Staff Reviews Accounting
Projects and Enforcement at Recent Conference, http://business.cch.comsecurities-
Law/news/12-23-04.asp (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
50. Id.
51. As of the end of 2007 the PCAOB has brought 16 enforcement proceedings.
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, PCAOB Disciplinary Proceedings,
http://www.pcaob.com/Enforcement/Disciplinary-Proceedings/index.aspx (last vis-
ited Apr. 18, 2008).
52. 47 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 487 (2008).
53. Id. § 473.
20081 505
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the literal meaning of res judicata is "matter adjudged," which
encompasses issue preclusion, and the term res judicata has in
fact been used to indicate issue preclusion in a number of
cases .54
As a result, the combined enforcement power of the PCAOB
and the SEC, and the increased level of engagement promised
by the SEC, could be restricted. For example, suppose both the
SEC and the PCAOB wanted to bring an action against Mr.
Smith, a public accountant, for his violation of the federal secur-
ities laws relating to the preparation and issuance of an audit
report. As explained in more detail below, under collateral es-
toppel, the PCAOB in an enforcement proceeding or the SEC in
both an administrative proceeding under Rule 102(e) and in an
injunctive action could be precluded from relitigating issues
that have already been litigated by the other against Mr. Smith.
At the same time, under the doctrine of res judicata, the
PCAOB in an enforcement proceeding or the SEC in both an
administrative proceeding under Rule 102(e) and in an injunc-
tive action could be precluded from relitigating claims that have
been or could have been litigated by the other against Mr.
Smith in the earlier action.
These potential restrictions of collateral estoppel and res
judicata on PCAOB or SEC actions are important to the parties
involved for a number of reasons. From the perspective of the
PCAOB and the SEC, concurrent jurisdiction offers certain ad-
vantages. First, it may act as a greater deterrent for someone
like Mr. Smith if he knows that he could potentially face multi-
ple enforcement actions for a single violation. Also, if the
PCAOB or the SEC were to bring a proceeding against Mr.
Smith first and were unsuccessful, then the other party would
still have a chance to obtain a ruling against Mr. Smith. From
Mr. Smith's perspective, the concurrent jurisdiction of the
PCAOB and the SEC represents a disadvantage. Mr. Smith
could be faced with the additional time and expense it would
take to defend himself in multiple enforcement actions. As a
result of being faced with this potential loss of time and money
in multiple actions, Mr. Smith may find it in his interest to just
54. Id. § 464.
[Vol. 28:495506
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settle these actions whether or not he has actually committed
any wrongdoings.
A. Preclusive Effect
Simply because the SEC is a government agency and the
PCAOB was intended to be a non-profit corporation (it appears
the PCAOB may in fact be treated as a government entity for
certain purposes55 ) does not mean their decisions cannot have a
preclusive effect. When an administrative agency such as the
SEC, acting in a judicial capacity, resolves disputed issues of
fact, which the parties had adequate opportunity to litigate, the
courts have not hesitated to apply collateral estoppel or res judi-
cata. 56 The question whether a PCAOB judgment can be preclu-
sive has yet to be considered by the courts. However, a number
of jurisdictions have held that judgments by non-governmental
entities acting in a judicial capacity can be preclusive.57 In or-
der to determine whether doctrines of a PCAOB judgment can
have a preclusive effect, it must be ascertained whether Con-
gress intended for PCAOB judgments to have such an effect.
55. See infra Section II B.1.c.i.
56. United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966) (su-
perseded by statute on other grounds); Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino,
501 U.S. 104, 109-10 (1991) (holding that the suitability of administrative claim
preclusion "may vary according to the specific context of the rights at stake, the
power of the agency, and the relative adequacy of agency procedures"); Jones v.
SEC, 115 F.3d 1173, 1178 (4th Cir. 1997) (assuming "that a prior SEC decision
based on the NASD's disciplinary order would have preclusive effect to the same
extent as any other agency decision where the agency acts in an adequately judi-
cial capacity"); SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1463-64 (2d Cir. 1996)
(holding that res judicata was inapplicable, not because SEC administrative judg-
ments are not preclusive, but because the suit based on fraudulent acts that oc-
curred after filing of prior suit, even though acts were part of same pattern that
formed basis of first suit).
57. Boguslavsky v. Kaplan, 159 F.3d 715 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that under
the doctrine of collateral estoppel investor was precluded from relitigating a num-
ber of issues previously litigated in a NASD arbitration hearing); Jones, 115 F.3d
at 1178 (holding that the defendant could identify a final judgment on the merits
entered by the NASD); Olick v. Dippel, 93 Fed. App'x 396 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding
that it is well-settled law that a NASD arbitration panel is a court of competent
jurisdiction for res judicata purposes); Zandford v. Prudential Sec., Inc., No. 94-
0036, 1995 WL 507169 (D.C. 1995) (holding that stockbroker was precluded from
relitigating claims that could have been litigated in an earlier New York Stock
Exchange ("NYSE") arbitration hearing).
13
PACE LAW REVIEW
The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that "where a common-
law principle is well established, as are the rules of preclusion,
the courts may take it as given that Congress has legislated
with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a
statutory purpose to the contrary is evident."'58 This, however,
does not require a definitive statement from Congress whereby
Congress precisely articulates an intention to overcome the pre-
sumption's application to a given statutory scheme. 59 Rules of
plain statement and strict construction apply only to the protec-
tion of weighty and constant values, be they constitutional or
otherwise. 60 The Court has held that the common law rules of
administrative preclusion do not represent such weighty and
constant values.6 1 For example, in Astoria Federal Savings and
Loan Association v. Solimino, the Court held that the statutory
scheme of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
implies that federal courts should not apply the doctrines of pre-
clusion to state administrative findings.62 The Court reasoned
that while the statute does not expressly discuss the preclusiv-
ity of administrative findings, certain sections of the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act make it clear that principles of
preclusion do not apply. One section of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act provides that if a state has its own age-dis-
crimination law, a federal plaintiff must pursue his claim with
the responsible state authorities before filing in federal court.63
Another section provides the deadline for filing Age Act claims
after the termination of state proceedings. 64 The Court stated
that "[b]oth provisions plainly assume the possibility of federal
consideration after state agencies have finished theirs."65
In the case of SOX, Congress failed to expressly or im-
pliedly evince any intention of whether the rules of preclusion
should apply to PCAOB proceedings. Congress never explicitly
stated that it intended for the PCAOB and the SEC to be able to
58. Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 501 U.S. at 108 (quoting Isbrandtsen Co.
v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 109.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 110.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 111.
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bring an action against the same public accountant arising out
of the same wrongdoing. SOX does state that nothing in that
Act shall limit the ability of the SEC to take legal, administra-
tive or disciplinary action against a public accountant. 66 How-
ever, it is unclear if this language was included in SOX to
ensure that the SEC retained its ability to take actions against
public accountants, or if it was meant to express that the SEC
and PCAOB will be allowed to take an action against the same
public accountant arising out of the same wrongdoing. Also,
SOX states that "[tihe [PCAOB is required] to notify the [SEC]
of any [PCAOB] pending investigation involving potential viola-
tions of the securities laws, and thereafter coordinate its [ef-
forts] with [those] of the [SEC's] Division of Enforcement as
necessary to protect an ongoing [SEC] investigation. ' '67 Once
again this statement could be interpreted in various ways. Per-
haps if Congress was contemplating multiple investigations, it
was also considering multiple enforcement actions. On the
other hand, this statement could also be interpreted that Con-
gress simply did not want the PCAOB interfering with an SEC
investigation. Lastly, there is some indication that Congress at-
tempted to at least partially model the PCAOB after the securi-
ties industry bodies known as self-regulatory organizations
("SROs"). Historically, the courts and the SEC have held that
actions by SROs, such as the National Association of Securities
Dealers ("NASD"), did not inhibit the SEC's own action. 68 This
does not appear to imply that Congress intended for preclusion
not to apply to PCAOB actions given that Congress could have
modeled the PCAOB exactly after the NASD or NYSE but in-
stead created the PCAOB with a number of notable differ-
ences.69 None of these instances appear to evidence an implied
statutory purpose to overcome the common law principle of pre-
clusion as was found in Astoria.
66. 15 U.S.C.A § 7202(c) (West 2004).
67. 15 U.S.C.A § 7215(b)(4)(A) (West 2004).
68. Jones v. SEC, 115 F.3d 1173, 1178 (4th Cir. 1997); Shearson, Hammill &
Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-7743, 42 S.E.C. 811, 852 n.88 (Nov. 12, 1965);
Lile & Co., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-7644, 42 S.E.C. 664, 668 & n.13
(July 9, 1965).
69. See infra Section II.C.3.
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B. Collateral Estoppel
1. Administrative Actions Under Rule 102(e)
The SEC, in administrative actions against a public ac-
countant or public accounting firm under Rule 102(e), 70 or the
PCAOB in an enforcement action, may be precluded from reliti-
gating issues already litigated by the other due to the legal doc-
trine of collateral estoppel. A number of authorities have
articulated the following three prerequisites to the application
of collateral estoppel in civil actions:
1) that the issue of fact or law was actually litigated in the prior
litigation;
2) that the issue at stake must be identical to the one involved in
prior litigation; and
3) that the determination of the issue in the prior litigation was a
critical and necessary part of the judgment in the earlier action. 71
In cases involving the government, there is a fourth re-
quirement as well. There has to be a mutuality of parties for
collateral estoppel to be applied against the government.7 2
70. The language of Rule 102(e) appears to pertain only to individual account-
ants. Rule 102(e) states that "The Commission may censure a person." 17 C.F.R.
§ 201.102(e)(1) (2006). However, the SEC has brought 102(e) actions against pub-
lic accounting firms. See In re Arthur Andersen LLP Respondent, Release No. 34-
44444 (June 19, 2001); In re KPMG LLP, Bryan E. Palbaum, CPA, John M. Wong,
CPA, Kenneth B. Janeski CPA, David A. Hori, CPA Respondent, Release No. 34-
50564 (Oct. 24, 2004). Also, when Congress codified Rule 102(e) it made it clear
that it applied to registered public accounting firms and associated persons. See
15 U.S.C.A. § 78d-3 (West 2004). As a result, public accountants and public ac-
counting firms will hereinafter be referred to as "public accountants."
71. Deweese v. Town of Palm Beach, 688 F.2d 731, 733 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing
Stovall v. Price Waterhouse Co., 652 F.2d 537, 540 (5th Cir. 1981)); see also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982) (defining issues preclusion as
when an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and
final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determina-
tion is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same
or a different claim).
72. Reich v. D.C. Wiring, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 105 (D.N.J. 1996) ("Although the
facts of Mendoza naturally limited its holding to cases involving nonmutual offen-
sive collateral estoppel, lower courts, in interpreting this holding, have generally
concluded that its logic applies with equal force to cases involving nonmutual de-
fensive collateral estoppel.") (citing Hercules Carriers, Inc. v. Claimant State of
Fla., 768 F.2d 1558, 1579-80 (11th Cir. 1985) (in case involving defensive estoppel,
state agency was allowed to relitigate issues already lost by another agency of the
same state due to the fact there was not a mutuality between the two agencies));
Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Council 214 v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 835 F.2d
510
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol28/iss3/2
TOO CLOSE FOR COMFORT
a. Prior Litigation of the Issue
Regarding whether the issue was actually litigated in the
prior litigation, it is assumed that, if the issues in question are
identical, they will already have been litigated by the SEC in a
Rule 102(e) proceeding or the PCAOB in an enforcement action.
The PCAOB and SEC could not avoid collateral estoppel or res
judicata simply by bringing actions simultaneously. When sep-
arate proceedings are brought simultaneously whichever judg-
ment comes first would leave open the defense of collateral
estoppel and res judicata in the other proceeding. 73 Therefore,
in the case of Mr. Smith, even if the PCAOB and the SEC were
to bring their proceedings simultaneously against Mr. Smith,
either the PCAOB or the SEC would have to obtain its judg-
ment first, resulting in the issues at stake being fully litigated.
b. Identical Issues That Are Critical to the
Judgment
In regards to whether the issues at stake would be identical
to the issues involved in the prior litigation, and whether these
issues are a critical and necessary part of the judgment of the
earlier action, enforcement proceedings brought by the PCAOB
against public accountants would be brought to determine if
there were any violations of the federal securities laws relating
to the preparation and issuance of audit reports, rules of the
PCAOB, provisions of SOX, 74 or professional standards.75 With
at least one exception, an SEC administrative proceeding under
Rule 102(e) would be brought to make the same determina-
tions.76 One such exception, in which the issues may not be
identical and collateral estoppel may not be applicable, is under
Rule 102(e) where the SEC can bring an action against a public
1458, 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Collateral estoppel will apply against the government
only if mutuality of parties exists.").
73. Sidag Aktiengesellschaft v. Smoked Foods Prod. Co., Inc., 776 F.2d 1270,
1275 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979) (enforc-
ing collateral estoppel against federal government where it had attempted to avoid
preclusion by maintaining two simultaneous actions)).
74. It should be noted that any violation of SOX is considered a violation of
the federal securities laws. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(47) (West 2004).
75. Id. § 7215(c)(4).
76. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2004).
2008]
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accountant for any violation of the federal securities laws,77
while the PCAOB can only bring an action for a violation of
those federal securities laws relating to the preparation and is-
suance of audit reports. 78 Although SOX does not specifically
state that the PCAOB can levy sanctions for a lack of integrity
or character or for not possessing the requisite qualifications, as
does Rule 102(e), those violations appear to be implicitly cov-
ered by its ability to levy sanctions for violations of professional
standards.79
In Mr. Smith's case, the issues surrounding whether he vio-
lated the profession's standards, for instance, should be identi-
cal in both a PCAOB enforcement proceeding and an SEC
proceeding under Rule 102(e). Also, the issues surrounding Mr.
Smith's alleged violation would be a critical and necessary part
of the judgment of the earlier action because those issues would
be essential in determining whether Mr. Smith violated the pro-
fession's standards.
c. Mutuality of Parties
In cases involving the government, the last element of col-
lateral estoppel requires that a finding be made that there is
mutuality between the parties. In order to meet this element, it
must be shown that the SEC and the PCAOB are the same
party or at least privies.80
77. Id.
78. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7215(c)(4) (West 2004).
79. The PCAOB has yet to set its final ethical standards and currently only
has a modest amount of interim standards in place. However, on an interim basis
the PCAOB has adopted the AICPA's Ethics Standards. ET section 102 states that
in the performance of a professional service, a public accountant shall maintain
objectivity and integrity, shall be free of conflicts of interest and shall not know-
ingly misrepresent facts or subordinate his or her judgment to others. ET § 102
(Jan. 12, 1988). Also, on an interim basis the PCAOB has adopted the AICPA's
Auditing Standards Board's Statement of Auditing Standards No. 95, as in exis-
tence on April 16, 2003. CODIFICATION OF STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS,
AU § 150 (AICPA 2002); Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Bylaws and
Rules - Professional Standards Rule 3200T (Apr. 16, 2003). See AU § 150.02
(AICPA 2002) (stating that all audits shall be performed by a person or persons
having adequate technical training and proficiency as an auditor).
80. Blonder-Tongue Labs. Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 320-21
(1971).
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i. Same Party
Congress set up the PCAOB as an independent entity in
the form of a non-profit corporation, and there is some sugges-
tion that it was intended to be autonomous.8' However, at least
for constitutional purposes, the Court has taken a formational
and functional view of the question of whether a separate corpo-
ration, under the auspices of the government, is in fact part of
the government. In Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Cor-
poration, the United States Supreme Court laid out a test to
determine whether the National Railroad Passenger Corpora-
tion ("Amtrak") was a governmental entity for constitutional
purposes.8 2 The Court began by noting, "'[t]hat the Congress
chose to call [Amtrak] a corporation does not alter its character-
istics so as to make it something other than what it actually
is.' ' 3 Therefore, it is not dispositive that SOX states that the
"[PCAOB] shall not be an agency or establishment of the United
States Government, and, except as otherwise provided in this
Act, shall be subject to, and have all the powers conferred upon
a nonprofit corporation by, the District of Columbia Nonprofit
Corporation Act."8 4 The Court in Lebron held that where the
government creates a corporation by special law, for the fur-
therance of governmental objectives, and retains for itself per-
manent authority to appoint a majority of the directors, that
corporation is part of the government and, therefore, is no dif-
ferent from the independent regulatory agencies such as the
SEC.85 The PCAOB appears to meet these criteria for the fol-
lowing reasons:
1. Congress created the PCAOB through a special law
(SOX);86
2. the government objectives were clearly listed;8 7 and
81. Congress had considered explicitly making the PCAOB part of the SEC.
See JICKLING, supra note 1, at 3.
82. Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 393 (1995).
83. Id. at 393 (quoting Cherry Cotton Mills, Inc v. United States, 327 U.S.
536, 539 (1946)).
84. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211(b) (West 2004).
85. Lebron, 513 U.S. at 398-400.
86. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211(a) (West 2004).
87. Id.
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3. the SEC retains for itself authority to appoint all the
directors of the PCAOB.88
The case that the PCAOB is a government agency is even
stronger than it was in Lebron, where the Court held that Am-
trak was a government agency.8 9 In Lebron, the directors of
Amtrak were not removable by the President for cause per the
explicit terms of the statute, and were not impeachable by Con-
gress.90 In the case of the PCAOB, the SEC can remove a direc-
tor of the PCAOB for good cause shown before the expiration of
the member's term.91
Government control was an important consideration
throughout the Lebron decision. 92 In fact, a number of courts
have held that the third prong in the Lebron test is whether the
government has control over an entity, which would encompass
a much broader range of factors than if one were to take a more
literal reading of Lebron.93 Under this interpretation of the
third prong, whether or not the government could appoint the
majority of an entity's directors would not be dispositive in de-
termining whether the entity is part of the "government itself."
Instead, the ability of the government to select directors is just
one factor a court would consider in determining the govern-
88. Id. § 7211(e).
Donna M. Nagy argues that the PCAOB does in fact meet the criteria of a
governmental agency as detailed in Lebron and could face a number of constitu-
tional ramifications as a result. See Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo With Con-
stitutional Law: The PCAOB and its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 975 (2005).
89. Lebron, 513 U.S. at 400.
90. Id. at 398.
91. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211(e)(6) (West 2004).
92. Lebron, 513 U.S. at 397 ("[tlhat Government-created and -controlled cor-
porations are (for many purposes at least) part of the Government itself has a
strong basis, not merely in past practice and understanding, but in reason itself").
93. Nagy, supra note 88, at 1043 (citing Sotack v. Pa. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar.
Ass'n, 104 F. Supp. 2d 471, 479 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (finding that an association of
insurers is considered a state entity for constitutional purposes); Jersawitz v. Peo-
ple TV, 71 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1338 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (holding that People TV is an
agency of the city for constitutional purposes); Becker v. Gallaudet Univ., 66 F.
Supp. 2d 16, 20-21 (D.C. 1999) (holding that despite its congressional creation and
governmental objectives, Gallaudet University is not an entity of the federal gov-
ernment for constitutional purposes); Wilkinson v. Legal Servs. Corp., 27 F. Supp.
2d 32, 45 (D.C. 1998) (holding that LSC is an entity of the federal government for
constitutional purposes); Clark v. County of Placer, 923 F. Supp. 1278, 1285 (E.D.
Cal. 1996) (holding that nonprofit fair association is an entity of the county for
constitutional purposes)).
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ment's control over an entity along with other factors such as
government funding, 94 government approval of rules or poli-
cies, 95 and governmental supervision.96 A logical extension of
the argument that a corporation is a government agency due in
part to the control the government exerts, is that the corpora-
tion in question would be part of the government agency that is
exerting the control. In this instance, the PCAOB would be part
of the SEC given the SEC's control over the PCAOB. Not only
does the SEC have control over appointing and removing the
PCAOB's directors, it has oversight and enforcement authority
over the PCAOB; 97 any final sanction imposed by the PCAOB
may be reviewed by the SEC; 98 the rules promulgated by the
PCAOB are subject to the approval of the SEC;99 the PCAOB is
required to submit an annual report (including its audited fi-
nancial statements) to the SEC; 100 the budget of the PCAOB is
subject to approval by the SEC; 10 1 the PCAOB is required to no-
tify the SEC of any PCAOB pending investigation involving po-
tential violations of the securities laws, and, thereafter,
coordinate its efforts with those of the SEC's Division of En-
forcement as necessary to protect an ongoing SEC investiga-
94. Nagy, supra, note 88, at 1043 (citing Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Coop. Ex-
tension, 252 F.3d 545, 552-53 (2d Cir. 2001) (concluding in dicta that a state-cre-
ated and state-fumded agricultural cooperative was a state actor even though only
two of its ten board members were appointed by the government)).
95. Id. (citing Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating that
the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board's assertion that it was a private entity
was "questionable" in light of the Lebron decision, despite the fact that the govern-
ment no longer plays a role in appointing MSRB members; vacant seats are filled
through a nomination committee composed of private individuals, with current
Board members ultimately electing the committee's nominees)).
96. Id. (citing Sotack, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 478 (stating that the Commissioner
of Insurance "has virtually limitless authority to supervise and regulate the
PPCIGA at all times")).
97. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7217(a) (West 2004).
98. Id. § 7217(c)(3). This argument in no way means to suggest that because
the federal courts can review a SEC decision, that the SEC should be considered
part of the federal courts. This factor, viewed in conjunction with all the other
listed factors, only adds to the argument that SEC is exerting control over the
PCAOB and is not dispositive in and of itself.
99. Id. § 7211(g).
100. Id. § 7211(h).
101. Id. § 7219(b).
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tion;1°2 and if the PCAOB wants to obtain a subpoena it must
request it from the SEC. 10 3
If the SEC were to apply the requirements it uses to govern
the consolidation of business entities for financial reporting
purposes to the PCAOB, then it would have to consolidate the
PCAOB into the SEC. Under GAAP, a parent company is re-
quired to consolidate all companies in which it has a controlling
financial interest.0 4 The SEC in its own Regulation S-X defines
control to include "the possession, direct or indirect, of the
power to direct or cause the direction of the management and
policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting
shares, by contract, or otherwise."'0 5 The SEC does not list spe-
cific criteria in determining when a less-than-majority owned
entity should be consolidated. 0 6 Instead, the SEC notes that
substance must be considered over form in determining an ap-
propriate consolidation policy. 10 7 As a result, if the SEC were to
apply its own rules and regulations regarding consolidation,
and consider substance over form, it would have to consolidate
the PCAOB into the SEC, given the control that the SEC exerts
over the PCAOB.
One could argue that the PCAOB is no different than the
NASD, which was held not to be the same party as or to be priv-
ies with the SEC by the Fourth Circuit in Jones v. Securities
and Exchange Commission.08 In Jones, a stockbroker con-
tended that the NASD's prior disciplinary action against him
precluded the SEC from bringing its own disciplinary proceed-
ing.10 9 Under the Lebron test, the NASD, unlike the PCAOB, is
truly an independent corporation or SRO. Unlike the PCAOB,
the NASD was not specifically created by the government under
a special statute'10 and the government did not retain for itself
102. Id. § 7215(b)(4).
103. Id. § 7215(b)(2)(D).
104. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, FINANcIAL ACCOUNTING
FOUNDATION, STATEMENT OF FINANcLAL ACCOUNTING STANDARD No. 94 (Oct. 1987).
105. Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-02(g) (2004).
106. Id. § 210.3A-02.
107. Id.
108. Jones v. SEC, 115 F.3d 1173, 1181 (4th Cir. 1997).
109. Id. at 1182.
110. An important distinction is that the NASD was created under the Malo-
ney Act. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-3 (West 2004). The NASD was not created by the Malo-
ney Act.
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permanent authority to appoint a majority of the NASD's direc-
tors."' Also, although the SEC may review NASD proceed-
ings, 1 2 unlike the PCAOB, the NASD is not required to submit
an annual report (including its audited financial statements) to
the SEC; the budget of the NASD is not subject to approval by
the SEC; and the NASD is not required to notify the PCAOB of
a pending investigation, and thereafter coordinate its efforts
with those of the SEC's Division of Enforcement as necessary to
protect an ongoing SEC investigation." 3 As a result, unlike the
NASD, the PCAOB is so closely controlled by the SEC that not
only may the PCAOB be a part of the government, it may be
part of the SEC itself.
Even if a court finds that the PCAOB is part of the govern-
ment and even more precisely that it is part of the SEC, the
question remains whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel is
required to be rooted in the U.S. Constitution. 1 4 The Court in
Lebron held that, while Congress's description of Amtrak as an
independent non-profit corporation is not dispositive of Am-
trak's status as a governmental agency for constitutional pur-
poses, it is dispositive for matters within Congress's control. 1' 5
The Court noted that some of the matters that are within Con-
gress's control include whether Amtrak is subject to statutes
that impose obligations or confer powers upon Government en-
tities, such as the Administrative Procedure Act and the laws
governing Government procurement." 6  Furthermore, the
Court stated that calling Amtrak a non-profit corporation can
suffice to deprive Amtrak of sovereign immunity from a law-
suit.1 7 The Court failed to note whether Congress calling an
entity a non-profit corporation would be dispositive of that en-
tity's status as a governmental agency in circumstances involv-
ing collateral estoppel. At least one lower court has held that
an entity can simultaneously be a governmental entity for
promissory estoppel purposes and not be a government entity
111. Id. § 78o-3(b)(4).
112. Id. § 78o-3(h)(3).
113. Id. § 78o-3.
114. As previously noted, the rules of preclusion are based in common law, not
the Constitution. See supra Section II.A.
115. Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 392 (1995).
116. Id.
117. Id.
5172008]
23
PACE LAW REVIEW
for constitutional purposes. 118 However, it is unclear based on
that holding if an entity can be a governmental entity for collat-
eral estoppel purposes as well.
ii. Privity
Given that there is an argument, albeit a somewhat attenu-
ated one, that the SEC and the PCAOB are the same party,
based on the relationship between the parties, there is an even
stronger argument that SEC and PCAOB are at least privies.
The Supreme Court has characterized privity as a "substantial
identity" between parties. 119 In United States v. ITT Rayonier,
Inc., the Ninth Circuit found that the relationship between the
United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and
the Washington Department of Ecology ("DOE") was suffi-
ciently close so that the EPA was collaterally estopped from re-
litigating an issue which had already been decided in a state
enforcement action brought by the DOE. 20 In reaching that de-
cision, the Ninth Circuit focused on the fact that the DOE and
the EPA's interests were identical in that they both acted to en-
force the same pollution discharge permit.1 2' With limited ex-
ception, the PCAOB and the SEC would be acting to enforce the
same rules. As previously noted, all enforcement proceedings
brought by the PCAOB against a public accountant would be
brought to enforce the federal securities laws relating to the
preparation and issuance of audit reports, rules of the PCAOB,
provisions of SOX or professional standards and, for the most
part, the same would be true in an action brought by the SEC in
a proceeding under Rule 102(e). 122
Even if the PCAOB is not found to be a government agency,
collateral estoppel would still potentially apply per the Ninth
Circuit's analysis in ITT Rayonier. The Ninth Circuit in ITT
Rayonier held that in some cases, "the relationship between
governmental authorities as public enforcers of ordinances and
private parties suing for enforcement ... is close enough to pre-
118. Paslowski v. Standard Mortgage Corp. of Ga., 129 F. Supp. 2d 793, 802
n.12 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (citing Mendrala v. Crown Mortgage Co., 955 F.2d 1132, 1139
(7th Cir. 1992)).
119. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611, 621 (1926).
120. United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 1980).
121. Id.
122. See supra Section I.C.
518 [Vol. 28:495
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol28/iss3/2
TOO CLOSE FOR COMFORT
clude relitigation."123 Also, in Montana v. United States, the
Court held that a prior judgment by the Montana Supreme
Court against a government contractor, which brought the suit
at the direction of the federal government, precluded the federal
government from relitigating the issue.124 In reaching its deci-
sion, the Court noted that there was mutuality between the fed-
eral government and the government contractor, given the
control the federal government exerted over the original litiga-
tion. 125 In the case of the SEC and the PCAOB, their relation-
ship is so close there is an argument that they are in fact the
same party.126 This closeness is a result of the control that the
SEC exerts over the PCAOB, including the actual and perceived
control the SEC will have over the PCAOB in its enforcement
actions. The SEC has actual control over the PCAOB in its en-
forcement actions in that any final sanction imposed by the
PCAOB may be reviewed by the SEC. 127 Also, if the PCAOB is
unable to obtain testimony or documents on a voluntary basis,
the PCAOB must request that the SEC issue a subpoena if it
wishes to obtain the information. 128 There is also a perception
of control, whether or not the SEC chooses to exert this control,
given that the SEC has permanent authority to appoint and re-
move the PCAOB's directors, 129 the budget of the PCAOB is
subject to approval by the SEC, 130 and the PCAOB is required to
notify the SEC of any PCAOB pending investigation, and there-
after coordinate its efforts with those of the SEC's Division of
Enforcement as necessary to protect an ongoing SEC
investigation. 131
This close relationship also helps distinguish the circum-
stances of the PCAOB and SEC from the holding in Jones.
Jones is the case in which the Fourth Circuit held that the
NASD and the SEC were not privies. 132 In reaching that deci-
123. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d at 1003.
124. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162 (1979).
125. Id. at 155.
126. See supra Section II.B.l.c.i.
127. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 88, 91 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
131. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7215(b)(4) (West 2004).
132. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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sion, the Fourth Circuit held that the NASD's interests in pros-
ecuting an enforcement action did not represent the same
interest the SEC had in reviewing the NASD action and, there-
fore, the parties were not privies. 133 In this instance, the SEC's
relationship with the PCAOB is more substantial than merely
reviewing a PCAOB enforcement action. 34
In determining whether two state government agencies
were privies, the Eleventh Circuit in Hercules Carriers ana-
lyzed not only whether the agencies had similar interests but
also whether the agencies had similar functions. 135 In deter-
mining whether the government agencies had similar functions,
the Eleventh Circuit looked to the purpose of the agencies in
bringing their actions. 136 It appears that the SEC acting under
Rule 102(e) and the PCAOB in an enforcement action have the
same functions in bringing actions against public accountants.
The SEC acting under Rule 102(e) and PCAOB enforcement ac-
tions are in place to protect the interest of public investors in
ensuring that they can have confidence in the integrity of the
financial reporting process. 137 It appears that the PCAOB and
SEC may or may not have similar functions if a court were to
look to the broader purpose of the SEC and PCAOB as organiza-
tions. The primary mission of the SEC is to protect investors
133. Jones v. SEC, 115 F.3d 1173, 1181 (4th Cir. 1997).
134. It is unclear whether the Fourth Circuit would have reached the same
conclusion in Jones if the SEC had brought an injunctive action against the broker,
as opposed to administrative proceedings. Unlike in an administrative action, the
SEC can bring an injunctive action for a violation of the rules of the NASD. 15
U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(1) (West 2004).
135. Hercules Carriers, Inc. v. Claimant State of Fla., Dep't of Transp., 768
F.2d 558, 1580 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that the State of Florida Department of
Professional Regulations and Department of Transportation were not considered
privies given they had different functions and interests).
136. Id.
137. In passing an amendment to Rule 102(e) the SEC noted that it wanted
Rule 102(e) to ensure that the SEC's "processes continue to be protected, and that
the investing public continues to have confidence in the integrity of the financial
reporting process." Amendment to Rule 102(e) of the SEC's Rules of Practice, 63
Fed. Reg. 57164-01, 57164-65 n.7 (Oct. 26, 1998). Similarly, the PCAOB was cre-
ated to "to protect the interests of investors and further the public interest in the
preparation of informative, accurate, and independent audit reports for companies
the securities of which are sold to, and held by and for, public investors." 15
U.S.C.A. § 7211(a) (West 2004). Therefore, it appears that both Rule 102(e) and
the PCAOB are in place to protect the interest of public investors in ensuring that
they can have confidence in the integrity of the financial reporting process.
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and maintain the integrity of the securities markets. 138 On the
other hand, the PCAOB was created to protect the interests of
investors and further the public interest in the preparation of
informative, accurate and independent audit reports for public
companies.139
This analysis suggests that whichever entity receives a
judgment first may preclude the other under collateral estoppel
from relitigating issues already litigated in the earlier action.
This is true given that the issues at stake in the SEC's adminis-
trative proceeding under Rule 102(e) should, for the most part,
be identical to the issues involved in the PCAOB enforcement
action and the determination of those issues in the prior litiga-
tion would be a critical and necessary part of the judgment in
the earlier action. Also, it appears that the mutuality require-
ment is met given that the SEC and the PCAOB may be the
same party or at least privies.
2. Injunctive Actions
The doctrine of collateral estoppel may also affect the
PCAOB or the SEC's ability to litigate in instances where the
SEC attempts to bring an injunctive action. Once again, it is
assumed for the purposes of this Article that the issues in ques-
tion, if the same, will already have been litigated by the SEC in
an injunctive action or the PCAOB in an enforcement action
and, therefore, the second prerequisite of collateral estoppel will
be met.140 As in the case where the SEC brings a Rule 102(e)
proceeding, if both the SEC (in an injunctive action) and the
PCAOB (in an enforcement action) were to bring simultaneous
actions against Mr. Smith either the PCAOB or the SEC would
have to obtain its judgment first resulting in the issues at stake
being fully litigated.' 4 ' Also, the fourth prerequisite is met,
given that the SEC and the PCAOB may be the same party or at
least privies. 142
138. The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml#intro (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
139. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
140. See supra Section II.B.l.a.
141. See supra Section II.B.l.a.
142. See supra Sections II.B.l.c.i. & II.B.l.c.ii.
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Regarding whether the issues at stake would be identical to
the ones involved in the prior litigation, and whether those is-
sues were a critical and necessary part of the judgment of the
earlier action, the PCAOB will have the power to bring proceed-
ings against public accountants for violations of the federal se-
curities laws relating to the preparation and issuance of audit
reports. 143 Injunctive actions brought by the SEC against pub-
lic accountants are brought in federal court under the federal
securities laws. 144 Hence, it is assumed that the SEC would, at
least in part, bring its injunctive action for the same violation of
the federal securities law as the PCAOB. For instance, suppose
both the PCAOB and SEC brought an action against Mr. Smith
for certifying publicly filed financial statements that he knew,
or was reckless in not knowing, were false in violation of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The issues surrounding his alleged viola-
tion of the federal securities laws should be identical in both a
PCAOB enforcement proceeding and an SEC injunctive pro-
ceeding. Also, the issues surrounding Mr. Smith's alleged viola-
tion would be a critical and necessary part of the judgment of
the earlier action because those issues would be essential in de-
termining whether Mr. Smith violated the federal securities
laws.
As a result, as in the case where the SEC brings an admin-
istrative proceeding, whichever entity receives a judgment first
may preclude the other, under collateral estoppel, from reliti-
gating issues already litigated in the earlier action.
C. Res Judicata
The doctrine of collateral estoppel is not the only legal doc-
trine that may affect the PCAOB's or the SEC's ability to liti-
gate when one or the other has already brought an action
against the same defendant. The PCAOB in an enforcement
proceeding or the SEC in an administrative proceeding under
Rule 102(e) or in an injunctive action may be precluded from
relitigating claims that have already been or could have been
litigated by the other.
143. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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1. Administrative Actions Under Rule 102(e)
Under res judicata, the SEC in an administrative proceed-
ing or the PCAOB in an enforcement proceeding could be barred
from pursuing an action if the other had already brought an ac-
tion against the same party. To establish a res judicata defense
in a civil action, a party must demonstrate:
1. a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit;
2. an identity of parties or their privies in the two suits;
and
3. an identity of the claim in both the earlier and the later
suit.1
45
a. Final Judgments and Identity of the Parties
Regarding the first prerequisite, for the purposes of this Ar-
ticle it is assumed that there would have been a final judgment
on the merits in a PCAOB enforcement proceeding or in an SEC
administrative proceeding under Rule 102(e).146 The SEC and
the PCAOB appear to be the same party or at least privies,
therefore, the third prerequisite may be met. 47 The remaining
question is whether there is an identity of the claims in an SEC
administrative proceeding brought under Rule 102(e) and a
PCAOB enforcement action.
b. Identity of the Claim
In modern case law, the term "claim"'48 has been given va-
ried application, depending largely on the facts in each case. In
some cases, the application of the term depends on whether the
evidence in the two cases is the same, in other cases on whether
the actions involve the same subject mater or wrongful act. 4 9
In a situation involving both criminal and civil proceedings, the
identity of claims fail given the varying burdens of proof re-
145. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979).
146. See supra Section II.B.l.a.
147. See supra Section II.B.l.c.
148. The term "claim" is often used synonymously with the term "cause of
action." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 247 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "claim" as
"cause of action").
149. Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 487-88 (4th Cir.
1981) (citing The Haytian Republic, 154 U.S. 118, 125 (1894); Baltimore S.S. Co. v.
Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321, (1927); Norman Tobacco & Candy Co. v. Gillette Safety
Razor Co., 295 F.2d 362, 363 (5th Cir. 1961)).
2008]
29
PACE LAW REVIEW
quired. 150 In the case of the PCAOB and SEC, it appears there
could be an identity of the claims when the PCAOB pursues an
enforcement action and the SEC pursues an administrative pro-
ceeding against the same public accountant for the same viola-
tion. For instance, suppose the PCAOB and the SEC were both
pursuing actions against Mr. Smith for his alleged violation of
the profession's standards while he was conducting an audit. In
this instance, the actions by the PCAOB and the SEC would
both concern the same subject-matter, i.e., Mr. Smith's conduct
during his audit. The two suits would also allege the same
wrongful act, i.e., Mr. Smith's violation of the profession's stan-
dards. Given that the subject mater would be the same and the
same wrongful act would be alleged, it is a logical assumption
that the evidence presented would likewise be the same.151
Also, the identity between two claims that are intimately
tied together will not fail simply because actions are based on
different statutes.152 Hence, the identity of the claims in this
instance will not be destroyed in the res judicata context due to
the fact that one action is based on SOX while the other is based
on Rule 102(e).
The identity between two claims will be destroyed, how-
ever, when the second claim is not capable of recovery in the
first action.153 Given that the identity between claims will be
destroyed if the second claim is not "then capable of recovery" in
150. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938) (superseded by statute on
other grounds) (holding that the difference in degree of the burden of proof in crim-
inal and civil cases precludes application of the doctrine of res judicata in a civil
suit based on a criminal case).
151. The Court has noted that "[ries judicata not only bars relitigation of
claims previously litigated, but also precludes claims that could have been brought
in earlier proceedings." Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 424 (2000). Therefore,
even if the SEC and PCAOB try to coordinate their actions so they are not bringing
overlapping claims they would not be able to avoid res judicata. For instance, sup-
pose the SEC decides to pursue an administrative action against Mr. Smith for his
violation of the securities laws. In coordinating with the SEC, the PCAOB, instead
of also bringing an action against Mr. Smith for his violation of the securities laws,
decides to bring an action against Mr. Smith for his violation of the profession's
standards. The PCAOB would still be barred under res judicata from litigating
this claim, because the SEC could have brought a claim against Mr. Smith for his
violation of the professions standards in the earlier action.
152. Nash County Bd. of Educ., 640 F.2d at 489.
153. 47 Am. JuR. 2D Judgments § 536 (2007) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 26).
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the first action, then depending on the facts and circumstances
there may not be an identity of all the claims in an SEC admin-
istrative proceeding under Rule 102(e) and a PCAOB enforce-
ment action. In cases where the PCAOB brings an action where
there was intentional or knowing conduct (including reckless
conduct) or repeated instances of negligent conduct, the PCAOB
can seek to levy fines, suspend or permanently revoke registra-
tion with the PCAOB, censure, require additional training or
any other appropriate sanction provided by the PCAOB,15 4
whereas the SEC under Rule 102(e) can only seek to censure or
to deny the privilege of practicing before the SEC. 155 As a re-
sult, the order of the forums would be crucial.
If the first forum is an SEC administrative proceeding
under Rule 102(e), the SEC would not be able to provide all the
relief sought in the PCAOB proceeding. Both a suspension of
registration with the PCAOB and the denial of the privilege to
practice before the SEC effectively act as bar on a public ac-
countant from preparing audit reports.156 Therefore, if the SEC
brought its administrative proceeding under Rule 102(e) first,
the PCAOB would be restricted by res judicata from seeking a
suspension of registration with the PCAOB, but it would not be
restricted in seeking a number of other penalties including, but
not limited to, monetary penalties. 57 If the order of the forums
were reversed, res judicata would appear to apply, given that all
the relief sought by the SEC would have been recoverable in the
PCAOB proceeding.
In cases where the PCAOB brings an enforcement action
for a single negligent act, the order of the forums would be irrel-
evant given the different relief that could be provided. The
PCAOB can seek a monetary penalty, censure, require addi-
154. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
156. 17 C.F.R. section 201.102(f) defines practicing before the SEC to include:
"The preparation of any statement, opinion or other paper by any attorney, ac-
countant, engineer or other professional or expert, filed with the Commission in
any registration statement, notification, application, report or other document
with the consent of such attorney, accountant, engineer or other professional or
expert." 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(f) (2004). 15 U.S.C.A section 7212(a) states that it
"shall be unlawful for any person that is not a registered public accounting firm to
prepare or issue, or to participate in the preparation or issuance of, any audit re-
port with respect to any issuer." 15 U.S.C.A § 7212(a) (West 2004).
157. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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tional training or any other appropriate sanction provided by
the PCAOB, but not a bar against practicing before the
PCAOB.158 In contrast, the SEC under Rule 102(e) can seek to
censure or to deny the privilege of practicing before the SEC.159
Hence, the identity between claims would be destroyed, since
the second claim would not be capable of recovery in the first
action.
Given the different remedies that can be provided in SEC
administrative actions and PCAOB enforcement proceedings,
depending on the order of the forums, res judicata may not ap-
ply if the claim was not capable of recovery in the earlier action.
2. Injunctive Actions
As in the case of administrative proceedings under Rule
102(e), the question of whether res judicata would be applicable
in cases of SEC injunctive actions hinges on whether there
would be an identity of the claims in an SEC injunctive action
and a PCAOB enforcement action against the same public
accountant.
Whether there would be an identity of claims can be
demonstrated by an action against our fictitious accountant Mr.
Smith. Suppose the PCAOB and the SEC were both pursuing
actions against Mr. Smith for certifying publicly filed financial
statements that he knew, or was reckless in not knowing, were
false, in violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. In this in-
stance, the actions by the PCAOB and the SEC would both con-
cern the same subject-matter, i.e., Mr. Smith's conduct while
certifying the financial statements. The two suits would allege
the same wrongful act, i.e., that Mr. Smith knew, or was reck-
less in not knowing that he prepared and certified publicly filed
financial statements that were false, in violation of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Given that the subject mater would be
the same and the same wrongful act would be alleged, it is a
logical assumption that the evidence presented would also be
the same.
However, as previously noted, the identity of two claims
will be destroyed if the second claim is not "then capable of re-
158. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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covery" in the first action.160 In this instance, the relief that the
SEC can seek in injunctive actions would not mirror the relief
that can be obtained in a PCAOB proceeding. The SEC in in-
junctive actions and the PCAOB in its enforcement actions can
both seek monetary penalties. 161 The SEC in injunctive actions
can also seek injunctions against future violations of the federal
securities laws. 162 Whereas in a PCAOB enforcement proceed-
ing, the PCAOB can additionally seek to have a public account-
ant deregistered from the PCAOB amongst other additional
penalties. 163
Given the different remedies that can be provided in injunc-
tive actions and PCAOB enforcement proceedings, no matter
the order of the fora, neither party would be completely barred
under res judicata from seeking relief that was not available in
the earlier action.
3. The NASD Comparison
The theory that res judicata may apply in instances where
the PCAOB and the SEC both pursue actions against the same
public accountant arising out of the same wrongdoing is not un-
dermined by Jones. Recall that the Fourth Circuit in Jones held
that that the SEC and NASD are not in privity with each
other. 64 The Fourth Circuit also held that the defendant could
not establish the second res judicata requirement, that the
SEC's subsequent enforcement action was the same claim as
the NASD's enforcement action. 165
Regarding the second requirement, the Fourth Circuit held
that, given the statutory schemes and the relationships be-
tween the parties, the NASD's enforcement actions were not
under the same claim as the SEC's later enforcement action.166
The court noted that the NASD order amounted to a final, inter-
nal NASD order sanctioning the defendant for violating the
160. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 31, 45 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
165. Jones v. SEC, 115 F.3d 1173, 1178 (4th Cir. 1997).
166. Id.
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NASD's established rules. 167 The SEC's administrative pro-
ceeding on the other hand was designed not only to protect the
integrity of the markets but also to vindicate the public interest,
as determined by an agency of the government created by Con-
gress to enforce the securities laws. 168 The Fourth Circuit also
considered the fact that that the SEC had more powerful autho-
rizations than the NASD, including the right to seek injunctive
relief.169
The holding of the Fourth Circuit in Jones may not be ap-
plicable to instances where the SEC and the PCAOB bring con-
current actions, given that the PCAOB and its enforcement
proceedings do not appear to be analogous to the NASD and its
enforcement proceedings. 170 The PCAOB, unlike the NASD,
will not bring an action solely for violations of PCAOB promul-
gated rules. The PCAOB's enforcement proceedings and the
SEC's administrative proceedings and injunctive actions, in
most instances, would be brought to make the same determina-
tion. They would be brought to determine if there were any vio-
lations of the securities laws relating to the preparation and
issuance of audit reports, rules of the PCAOB, provisions of
SOX, or professional standards.' 7' Also, the PCAOB, unlike the
NASD, was specifically created by Congress and is arguably in
privity with the SEC if not a part of the SEC itself. 72 Regard-
ing the authorization, in certain circumstances it would be the
PCAOB that has the greater authorization, and if the SEC were
to bring an action after the PCAOB all the relief sought by the
SEC would have been recoverable in the PCAOB proceeding.
Where the PCAOB brings an action and there was intentional
167. Id. at 1180. It is unclear whether the Fourth Circuit would have reached
the same conclusion in Jones if the SEC had brought an injunctive action against
the broker, as opposed to administrative proceedings. Unlike an administrative
action, the SEC can bring an injunctive action for a violation of the rules of the
NASD. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(1) (West 2004).
168. Jones, 115 F.3d at 1180.
169. Id.
170. The NASD was consolidated with the member regulation, enforcement
and arbitration functions of the New York Stock Exchange in July 2007 creating
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA"). Program for Allocation of
Regulatory Responsibilities, Exchange Act Release No. 34-56148, File No. 4-544
(Jul. 26, 2007).
171. See supra Section II.B.1.
172. See supra Section II.B.1.c.
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or knowing conduct (including reckless conduct) or repeated in-
stances of negligent conduct on the part of the public account-
ant, the PCAOB can seek to levy fines, suspend or permanently
revoke registration with the PCAOB, censure, require addi-
tional training or any other appropriate sanction provided by
the PCAOB;173 whereas, the SEC under Rule 102(e) is limited to
censure and denying the public accountant the privilege of prac-
ticing before the SEC. 174 Therefore, the holding by the Fourth
Circuit in Jones may not be applicable to enforcement actions
by the PCAOB and SEC, given that: the PCAOB unlike the
NASD was specifically created by Congress; for the most part,
the PCAOB will bring its enforcement proceedings for the same
violation as the SEC; in some instances, the PCAOB will have
greater authorization than the SEC; and the PCAOB and SEC
appear to be privies, if not in fact the same party.
III. Regulating Public Accounts With or Without
Congressional Action
It appears that the SEC or the PCAOB may be severely
limited in bringing actions where one or the other has already
brought an action against the same defendant. Given that the
PCAOB was created for the sole purpose of regulating public
accountants, it seems a logical inference to expect that the SEC
would defer to the PCAOB and allow it to adjudicate matters
first. If the SEC chooses to allow the PCAOB to bring its ac-
tions ahead of the SEC, one limitation the SEC may face is that
it will be barred under the doctrines of collateral estoppel from
relitigating issues, in administrative actions and in injunctive
proceedings, that were already litigated by the PCAOB. 175 The
second limitation the SEC could face, is that it may also be
barred under res judicata from relitigating claims, in adminis-
trative actions and in injunctive proceedings, that were liti-
gated or could have been litigated by the PCAOB.176 Although
the SEC may never be completely barred under res judicata
from relitigating claims in injunctive proceedings, given that
there are a number of remedies that are not recoverable in a
173. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
175. See supra Sections I.B.1. & II.B.2.
176. See supra Sections II.C.1 & II.C.2.
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PCAOB enforcement action, 177 the reason the SEC in recent
years had been relying so heavily on Rule 102(e) administrative
actions is that federal courts have made it increasingly difficult
for the SEC to obtain injunctive relief.178 Also, if a number of
issues were already decided against the PCAOB in an earlier
action, collateral estoppel could make the question of whether
res judicata applies less significant.
A. Congressional Action
Congress could choose to intervene in an attempt to remove
the restrictions of collateral estoppel and res judicata. Congress
could simply amend SOX to state that collateral estoppel and
res judicata do not apply to the PCAOB and SEC where one or
the other has already brought an action against the same
defendant. 179
Congress could also choose to work within the parameters
of the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata. If Con-
gress chooses this path, it could amend SOX so that there is no
question that the PCAOB and the SEC are neither the same
party nor privies. In order for the PCAOB to no longer be con-
sidered part of the government, or more importantly part of the
SEC, under the Lebron test Congress would have to strip the
SEC of its ability to appoint the PCAOB's directors and grant
that responsibility to some nongovernmental body or bodies. 80
Given the interrelatedness of the SEC and PCAOB, it is un-
clear how far Congress would have to go in amending SOX to
ensure that the PCAOB and the SEC are not privies. Due to the
fact that the NASD and the SEC were held not to be privies in
Jones,'"' perhaps the NASD can be used as a litmus test or
baseline for Congress in determining required revisions to SOX.
If Congress decides to use the NASD as its model for the
PCAOB, along with stripping the SEC of its ability to select and
remove the PCAOB's directors, Congress would also have to
177. See supra Section II.C.2.
178. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 58.
180. It seems unlikely that Congress would act on one of the other two prongs
of the Lebron test, given that such an action would require Congress to either dis-
solve the PCAOB or make the government objectives more vague. See supra notes
86-89.
181. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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take away the SEC's ability to control the PCAOB's budget, and
no longer require that the PCAOB coordinate its pending inves-
tigations involving potential violations of the securities laws
with the SEC.182 Based on the guidance in Jones, Congress
would not have to strip the SEC of its ability to review sanctions
imposed by the PCAOB.183
B. Achieving Regulatory Goals Without Congressional
Intervention
If Congress chooses not to act, and the SEC chooses to defer
to the PCAOB despite all of the potential restrictions, this does
not necessarily mean that the SEC and PCAOB would not be
able to meet the regulatory interest of SOX. Acting in a coordi-
nated manner, a strong and vibrant PCAOB, with oversight
from the SEC, could meet the goals of SOX as it pertains to the
regulation of public accountants.
Pre-SOX public accountants performing audits of financial
statements filed with the SEC were essentially self-regulated.
This self-regulation was for the most part left to an ineffective
AICPA,184 which was overseen in part by a non-independent
POB.18 5 The SEC also participated in the regulation, but it only
had the resources to bring enforcement actions for the most
egregious violations.18 6 Post-SOX, the SEC, acting through an
appropriately aggressive PCAOB, has the opportunity to rem-
edy these problems that previously existed with the AICPA and
an under funded POB and SEC.
Adequate resources to carry out its mandate should not be
an issue for the PCAOB given that it receives its funding di-
rectly from accounting firms, through registration and annual
fees, and from public companies in the form of mandatory "ac-
182. See supra Section II.B.l.c.i. Such a reduction in the oversight capabili-
ties of the SEC may not be acceptable to Congress, given that in the legislative
history to SOX, Congress noted that strong SEC oversight of the PCAOB was im-
portant because it assures that the PCAOB's policies are consistent with the ad-
ministration of the federal securities laws, protects the rights of accounting firms
and individuals subject to the PCAOB's jurisdiction, and it allows the public an
important forum for commenting on PCAOB rules relating to auditing, quality con-
trol, and related standards. S. REP. No. 107-205, at 12 (2002).
183. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 14,15 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 18, 19 and accompanying text.
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counting support fees." 18 7 There is a large incentive for compa-
nies to pay these accounting support fees. No registered public
audit firm can sign an unqualified audit opinion, or issue a con-
sent to an issuer's financial statements, if that public company
has past-due annual payments to the PCAOB.l88 For the fiscal
year 2006, the SEC approved a budget for the PCAOB of $128
million.189
Although the SEC may not always directly bring enforce-
ment actions, this does not mean that the SEC, independent of
the PCAOB, will simply be a bystander in the enforcement pro-
cess. In this new enforcement paradigm, the SEC will oversee
the PCAOB and has the opportunity to ensure that the PCAOB
is acting appropriately in its enforcement capacity. Former
SEC Chairman, William 0. Douglas, once noted that in the gov-
ernment's oversight of self-regulatory organizations the "gov-
ernment would keep the shotgun, so to speak, behind the door,
loaded, well-oiled, clean, ready to use but with the hope that it
would never have to be used." 90 Perhaps the SEC's oversight of
the PCAOB will take a similar form, except given the control
the SEC exerts over the PCAOB, the SEC's shotgun might be
brandished out in the open. In order to ensure the PCAOB is
performing its duty as required by SOX, the SEC has the power
to sanction the PCAOB if it is not diligent in performing its du-
ties and the SEC also has the option of removing the directors of
the PCAOB.191
Congress did not just provide the SEC with sanction power,
it also ensured that the SEC would receive the funding and in-
formation the SEC would need for proper oversight of the
PCAOB. As of 2006, Congress has increased the SEC's budget
by 90 percent since 2002 from $466 million 92 to $888 million. 193
187. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7219(c)(1) (West 2004).
188. PCAOB Rule 7103(b) (2004).
189. PCAOB BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2006 (2006), available at http:ll
www.pcaob.com/About-thePCAOB/BudgetPresentations/2006.pdf.
190. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 82 (James Allen ed.,
1940).
191. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7217(d) (West 2004).
192. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON SEC's
SPENDING AND STRATEGIC PLANNING, GAO-03-969T (2003), available at http:ll
www.gao.gov/new.items/d03969t.pdf.
193. U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, FISCAL 2007 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET RE-
QUEST (2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secfy07budgetreq.pdf.
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Also, SOX requires that the PCAOB provide the SEC with the
information that the SEC will need to monitor the PCAOB's en-
forcement actions. The PCAOB is required to notify the SEC of
any PCAOB pending investigation involving potential viola-
tions of the securities laws, and thereafter, coordinate its efforts
with those of the SEC's Division of Enforcement. 194 Impor-
tantly, this sharing of information will not result in the loss of
the information's status as confidential and privileged in the
hands of the PCAOB. 195 After its review of the information, the
SEC will have the opportunity to decide whether it would
rather let the PCAOB bring the suit or to bring the suit itself. 196
The SEC may choose to bring a suit in the place of the
PCAOB for a number of reasons. For instance, the SEC may
want to utilize rule 102(e) as it has previously to explain the
application of professional standards for accountants. 97 In the
past, the SEC's guidance to accountants on particular aspects of
the audit function in 102(e) proceedings was often more exten-
sive than those issued by the profession's standard-setting
bodies.198
There are also some advantages to the SEC bringing cer-
tain actions in the place of the PCAOB. The PCAOB can only
seek monetary penalties, censure, require additional profes-
sional education or training, and any other appropriate sanc-
tion provided for in the rules of the PCAOB when there has
been a single instance of negligent conduct. 99 The PCAOB can-
not seek temporary or permanent revocation of registration
with the PCAOB for a single instance of negligent conduct. 200
In contrast, in Rule 102(e) proceedings for improper profes-
sional conduct, the SEC may bar an individual from tempora-
194. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7215(b)(4) (West 2004).
195. Id. § 7215(b)(5).
196. It is unclear if Congress intended, by forcing the PCAOB to coordinate its
efforts with those of the SEC's Division of Enforcement, that the SEC would be
able to decide whether it brings an action in the place of the PCAOB. However,
given the control the SEC exerts over the PCAOB, it can be assumed that the SEC
would be able to decide whether it would rather let the PCAOB bring an action or
to bring the action itself.
197. Daniel L. Goelzer & Susan Ferris Wyderko, Rule 2(e): Securities and Ex-
change Commission Discipline of Professionals, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 652, 666 (1991).
198. Johnson & Albert, supra note 36, at 600.
199. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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rily or permanently appearing or practicing before the SEC due
to a single instance of highly unreasonable conduct that results
in a violation of applicable professional standards. 20 1
Conclusion
Without Congressional action, the regulation of public ac-
countants might not take the form that the SEC intended be-
cause of the potential restrictions that the doctrine of collateral
estoppel and res judicata could pose. However, even without
Congressional action, past regulatory inadequacies may still be
cured through a vibrant PCAOB that is closely governed by the
SEC.
201. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
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